Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| De dicto: statements about the nature of linguistic expressions and their consequences are de dicto. Concepts necessarily have certain characteristics, as opposed to objects (res) the properties of which are considered as contingent by many authors. See also de re, modality, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Wiggins on de dicto - Dictionary of Arguments
II 303 Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: e.g. necessarily (x) (x = Cicero)> (x is a man). de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong: necessarily (Ez) (x) (x = z> (x is a man). II 312 de dicto/necessary/metalanguage/Wiggins: I must still be dissuaded from reading "necessary" metalinguistically de dicto, namely as a predicate of sentences that has a broader sense than is provable. >Necessity, >Provability, cf. >de re, >Metalanguage._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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